Proxies, Shareholder Consent, and Options Backdating Litigation
The complaint is filed on behalf of a purported class of shareholders who received Zoran proxy statements between April 30, 1999 and May 1, 2006. The class period covers this longer period even though the allegedly improper grants took place between 1998 and 2001 because each of the allegedly improper grants were for a term of ten years, so the first date at which the grants expire has not yet occurred, while the Company has continued to issue proxy statements allegedly containing misleading information about the grants.
Under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its corresponding rules, whenever shareholders must approve a compensation plan, the issuer must accurately disclose the material elements of the proposed plan. With respect to stock options, the compensation disclosure must include the grant date, the exercise price, and grant and exercise tax consequences for the issuer and the recipient. If the issue is soliciting proxies in connection with the grant of stock options having a below-market exercise price, the issuer must disclose the option exercise price and the market price on the grant date, as well as the value of the options at the market price on the grant date.
If the company does not apply the proper tax treatment for below market options grants, the proxy disclosures may inaccurately reflect the tax consequences for grant and exercise. Because the difference between the grant and market prices for backdated options represents income to the recipient, the recipient must pay tax and withholding on the difference. The issuer could be liable for income and FICA tax it failed to withhold upon exercise, as well as interest and penalties. In addition, because the difference between the exercise price and the market price represents compensation, it counts toward the $1 million maximum for each executive’s compensation deductibility under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m). If the issuer did not allow for this compensation in connection with deduction for the executive’s compensation, the issuer could owe additional taxes, interest and penalties.
Even if we assume that the plaintiffs' allegations are true, the value of the remedies the Zoran plaintiffs’ seek is uncertain. The complaint seeks to void the election of directors based on the allegedly improper proxies, which seems like a perhaps principled but not very financially valuable remedy at this late date (unless you assume for the sake of discussion that shareholders are better off without any of the current directors involved with Zoran in any way). The complaint also seeks unspecified damages. Whether the plaintiffs can demonstrate damages that are not simply speculative or fraught with causation questions seems debatable, at best.
Bruce Vanyo and Michael Weisman of the Katten Muchin Rosenman firm have written an interesting paper entitled “Backdating Stock Options: An Overview” (here) that examines these proxy solicitation and income tax issues, as well as other legal issues surrounding option backdating, in much greater depth.
Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Lies, Damned Lies blog for the link to the Vanyo paper.
The Securities Litigation Watch blog is also maintaining a list of securities class action lawsuits relating to options backdating, which may be found here.
The Fugitive: Kobi Alexander, the former CEO of Comverse Technology and a fugitive from criminal allegations filed against him in connection with the options backdating investigation at the company, has been found in
Now This: While many astronomers (and bloggers) still hope for signs of intelligent life on planet Earth, signs of another sort abound (here). Caution: Viewer discretion advised, may not be appropriate for all audiences.