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In its 2007 year-end study of securities class action trends (here
), NERA Economic Consulting
noted that the "sharp increase" in 2007 securities lawsuit filings was "driven in part by litigation related to subprime lending," an observation I have also noted elsewhere
. Given the importance of the subprime lawsuit filings to the overall 2007 securities lawsuit picture, it is worth taking a closer look at the 2007 subprime-related securities lawsuits.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that I have counted 34 subprime-related securities lawsuits during 2007 (as detailed here
), whereas in its year-end report NERA stated that there were 38 subprime-related lawsuits. The difference may be merely definitional, as it became harder to classify cases as the year progressed. NERA may also have superior information, a not unlikely possibility given that my data are derived solely from publicly available sources. In any event, readers should be aware that the analysis in this post is limited to the 34 lawsuits in my tally.
The 34 companies sued in the subprime-related lawsuits represent 15 different Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
Codes. The largest concentration of cases is in the 6798 SEC Code
(Real Estate Investment Trusts), which accounted for 11 of the34 cases. Fully 30 of the 34 companies sued fall within the 6000 SIC Code Series
(Finance, Insurance and Real Estate).
Another way to look at the companies is by industry, rather than by SIC Code. As might be expected, there are more companies is in the banking/mortgage lending business than any other industry; this group accounted for 12 of the companies sued. Other industry groups with multiple companies represented included residential home builders (5), REITs (5), Bond Insurers (3) and Credit Rating Agencies (2). Other industries represented with one company each include mortgage investment companies, mutual funds, and savings and loans. (The list of companies also includes Freddie Mac, which as a government sponsored entity is hard to classify.)
The subprime-related lawsuits were filed in 15 different federal district courts, with the largest number filed in the Southern District of New York (11). Other courts with multiple filings include the Central District of California (6), Eastern District of Pennsylvania (3) and the Northern District of California (2).
The list of companies sued includes two that are domiciled overseas: UBS (Switzerland) and Security Capital Assurance (Bermuda). One of the subprime-cases – the one involving Security Capital Assurance – involves IPO-related allegations.
The 34 subprime-related lawsuits were filed between February and December 2007, with at least one lawsuit filed in each month during that period. There were two in February, four in March, two in July, eight in August, four in September, two in October, five in November, and four in December.
In other words, the subprime-related lawsuits, while concentrated in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate SIC Codes, represent a number of different industries. The lawsuits have been filed in a number of different courts, but with a concentration in New York and Los Angeles. The lawsuit filings were spread (albeit somewhat unevenly) throughout the year. These observations seem relevant to any analysis of what the cases might represent within the larger context of securities filing trends.
Mortgage Investigations Face Challenges:
A December 27, 2007 Washington Post
article entitled "Mortgage Probes Face Big Hurdles" (here
) notes that as problems have emerged following the subprime mortgage meltdown, "government subpoenas are flying, investor lawsuits are mounting, and in the nastiest cases, businesses are pointing the finger of blame at one another. "
But despite the almost irrepressible urge to find scapegoats, investigators could face significant hurdles due to the "tangled system" of regulatory authority and oversight. In addition, another consideration that could stymie investigators, and that could be a factor in the many investor lawsuits, is that "many of the assets that tumbled were explicitly marketed as involving borrowers with trouble credit histories, alerting investors that they were high-risk bets."
White Collar Fraud is Not Just Wrong, It’s Insane!:
Regular readers may recall my prior post (here
) about former Crazy Eddie
CFO (and convicted felon) Sam E. Antar, who is now making a name for himself warning others about how to spot fraud. A lengthy December 25, 2007 Fortune Magazine
article entitled "Takes One to Know One" (here
) takes a closer look at Antar. and his current campaign to combat fraud.
The detailed article reviews the Crazy Eddie fraud in depth and explains how Antar has become a roving lecturer on accounting fraud. The article summarizes Antar’s strategy for finding fraud as "sustained and disciplined paranoia." He also says that the only safeguards against accounting fraud that work are "stringent disclosure rules for companies and better fraud training for auditors."
Interested readers may want to check out Antar’s blog, White Collar Fraud
), for further commentary from Antar, who signs his blog posts as follows: "Respectfully, Sam E. Antar (former Crazy Eddie CFO and convicted felon)."